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ABSTRACT 
 
Color realism refers to that things are colored, or colors are real. Although the view goes in a 
minority opinion, Byrne & Hilbert defend it based on the physical properties of color and the 
peculiarly assumed hue-magnitudes. However, hues are mind-dependent and cannot be used as a 
measure of the physical properties of things. As a result, the defense fails to justify the proposition 
of color realism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In their work entitled “Color Realism and Color 
Science,” Byrne & Hilbert defend the view of 
color realism. [1] This essay contends that the 
defense is invalid. The argument goes as follows: 
Section 2 introduces a central debate on the 
validity of the color realism; Section 3 
summarizes Byrne & Hilbert’s argument of the 
Reflectance Physicalism; Section 4 analyzes the 
congenital deficiency of the argument; and, 
Section 5 gives a conclusion. 
Commentary 
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2. CENTRAL DEBATE  
 
Color realism refers to that things are colored, [2] 
or colors are real. [3] It claims that physical 
objects are colored, and that colors are physical 
properties. [4] At least since the 17th century, the 
validity of color realism has remained a central 
debate over such a primary issue: whether colors 
are real (objective or mind-independent), or, they 
are merely illusory (subjective or mind-
dependent), or, something else. [5]  
 
Until now, the problem has increasingly triggered 
vigorous disputes, and becomes the subject of a 
renewed burst of attention. [6] A bundle of 
propositions has hitherto been formed, including, 
but not limited to: (1) Realism or Objectivism or 
Materialism; [7] (2) Dispositionalism or 
Subjectivism; [8] (3) Projectivism; [9] (4) 
Eliminativism or Irrealism or Fictionalism or 
Illusionism; [10] (5) The Ecological View; [11] (6) 
Relationalism; [12] as well as additional 
digressions like, Independent Ambiguism [13] 
and those on naturalistic theories of content. [14]   
 
3. BYRNE & HILBERT’S ARGUMENT 
 
Among these theories, color realism goes in a 
minority opinion at least among color scientists. 
[15] Albeit the fact it is, Byrne & Hilbert 
expressed their dissent against popular color 
theories on their color-realist ground. They 
proposed a so-called Reflectance Physicalism, 
i.e., colors are the surface spectral reflectance of 
light, i.e., the proportion of incident light the 
object is disposed to reflect at each wavelength 
in the visible spectrum. [16] The theory is 
established based on the three assumptions as 
follows: [17]  
 
(1) Objects are featured by color-constancy 
and illumination-independence, and human 
visual systems are able to recover from the 
responses of the three kinds of cone 
photoreceptors;  
(2) Colors of objects are caused by the light of 
illuminants which reaches eyes and 
stimulates the three kinds of visual cone 
photoreceptors, after reflected by the 
objects; and,  
(3) Visual experience represents objects as 
having proportions of hue-magnitudes—
when things look to have certain amounts 
of hue-magnitudes, they look determinate 
colors; different determinate hues 
determine different colors. Here, hue is a 
certain attribute of visual sensation, [18] 
including four unique types: red, yellow, 
green, and blue, [19] while a hue-
magnitude is the proportionality of one hue 
among a sum of hues possessed by an 
object. [20]  
 
While the first assumption solidifies conditions of 
any plausible version of physicalism to identify 
colors in the causal process that underlies the 
color perception, the second one describes the 
importance of the spectral reflectance of light in 
the illuminant-object-stimulus chain where colors 
are perceived as a property of the object; by 
contrast, the last one offers an innovative 
ingredient which characterizes the theory as the 
most elaborated version of color realism.  
 
The paradigm of Reflectance Physicalism is used 
as a distinctive philosophical tool to defend color 
realism. It is also used to counteract common 
objections by clarifying various positions and 
central arguments. The theory has been 
considered as the only theory which does not 
“have serious difficulties” or is not “unmotivated;” 
thus, it “can be smoothly integrated with much 
empirical work”. [21]  
 
On the one side, the theory stresses the physical 
properties of color resultant from the surface 
spectral reflectance of light: (1) Colors are 
identical with types of surface reflectance and 
each color is a type of reflectance; [22] (2) Two 
types of reflectance are of the same type if and 
only if the both have the same relative amounts 
of 3-cone visual lights at short (S), medium (M), 
and long (L) wavelengths; [23] (3) Things look 
the same (different) in color when they are of the 
same (different) reflectance type with the same 
(different) amount of S, M, and L lights in the 
stimulation of our visual 3-cones in the same way 
(different ways). [24]  
 
On the other side, in view of the peculiarly 
assumed hue-magnitudes, the theory holds that 
(1) Things look to have different amounts of hues, 
and objects seen as colored are represented as 
having proportions of hue-magnitudes; [25] (2) 
Although something with an amount of hue is not 
perfectly alike in color, there is something in 
common between hue and color: things look 
determinate colors because they look to have 
certain amounts of hue magnitudes; [26] (3) A 
group of four hue-magnitudes (R: reddish; G: 
greenish; B: bluish; Y: yellowish) are necessary 
for an object to possess certain values of the 
hue-magnitudes; [27] (4) The hue-magnitudes 
are themselves physical: a hue is unique just in 
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case it has only one hue magnitude, while it is 
binary if it has some amount of multiple hue 
magnitudes; [28] (5) The four hue-magnitudes, R, 
G, B, and Y, could be derived from the cone 
outputs in stimuli in terms of the relative S, M, 
and L responses: R is reached if M<L for (M-L); 
G is reached if M>L for (M-L); B is reached if 
S>(M+L) for [S-(M+L)]; and Y is reached if 
S<(M+L) for [S-(M+L)]. [29] 
 
4. DEFICIENCY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 
Byrne & Hilbert’s argument is based on updating 
the mind-dependent perceptions in the causal 
process. The new vision leads to the commonly 
accepted color vision relevant to the mentioned 
three visual cones, along with the mind-
independent proportions of the hue-magnitudes 
acquired through gerrymandering the 3-cone 
lights coming from object’s surface spectral 
reflectance of some illuminant. [30]  
 
The theory appears to be so coherent and 
convincing to render the non-physical process of 
“color perception” into a physical regime of “hue-
magnitudes” to defend color realism against all 
the objections. These opposite views may prove 
fatal, as recorded in a recent literature (see 
details in Open Peer Commentary: pp.22-51, and 
Authors’ Response: pp.52-59, in Ref.1). 
Regardless of these objections, we admire Byrne 
& Hilbert’s extraordinary endeavor to push 
forward the minority “color realism” opinion to the 
climax, especially their courage to suggest that 
“colors of visual experience are in fact 
reflectance of objects as having proportions of 
mind-independent hue-magnitudes.” [31]  
 
Nevertheless, there exists a congenital 
deficiency in their argument to provide a valid 
response to such a basic question: can the 
supposed “mind-independent” hues be used as a 
measure of the physical properties of things? 
Let’s start from the essence of Byrne & Hilbert’s 
theory. It rests on the employment of the 
reflectance-related hues to represent the 
physical feature of objects beyond those mind-
independent physical ones in the scientific field, 
such as, mass, charge, spin, charm, etc.  
 
To make the target attainable, the theory takes it 
for granted that hues are determined by the 
power distributions of the surface spectral 
reflectance of light. 32] Surprisingly enough, as 
presented in point (4) above, the authors 
estimate the four hue-magnitudes with respect to 
the mind-dependent relative responses of the 
three kinds of cone photoreceptors in human 
visual systems, unaware of the fact that the 
visual cones are assumed to recover the 
proportion of incident light that the object is 
disposed to reflect at all respective wavelengths 
in the visible spectrum. [33] Naturally, the 
paradigm leads to the following premise-
conclusion reasoning: 
 
Premise 1: Physical properties of things (like 
mass, charge, spin, charm) are mind-
independent.  
 
Premise 2: Hue-magnitudes are obtained by 
evaluating the mind-dependent relative 
responses of the 3-kind cone photoreceptors in 
human visual systems to the spectral reflectance 
of light.  
 
Conclusion: Hues are not mind-independent and 
cannot be used as a measure of the physical 
properties of things.  
 
Clearly, the conclusion is contrary to Byrne & 
Hilbert’s employment of the reflectance-related 
hues to represent the physical feature of objects. 
This indicates that their argument has a serious 
inborn problem about the preliminary “hue” 
recognition, a concept which is unable to be 
resolved within the scope of the authors’ 
elaborated paradigm.  
 
Therefore, instead of becoming an expected 
compelling version of color realism to effectively 
identify colors with observer-independent 
features of the world, Byrne & Hilbert’s theory 
fails, at the least, to defend color realism against 
other objections. On the contrary, it invalidates 
further the proposition of color realism due to the 
presence of the mind-dependent hue conception 
in their argument.  
 
It deserves to mention that even the authors 
themselves admit the existence of this mind-
dependent feature in their model, though 
implicitly: The reflectance-types that we identify 
with the colors will be quite uninteresting from the 
point of view of physics or any other branch of 
science unconcerned with the reactions of 
human perceivers. [34] 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Byrne & Hilbert’s theory of reflectance 
physicalism is supposed to defend the color 
realism. However, the use of the mind-dependent 
hue-magnitude makes it hard to justify their 
argument that colors are certain sorts of physical 
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properties. The theory draws no appeal to the 
proposition of color realism. 
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